

**INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF LAW  
MANAGEMENT & HUMANITIES**  
**[ISSN 2581-5369]**

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**Volume 3 | Issue 3**

**2020**

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# Capital Punishment

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## ABSTRACT

*The legal framework of many countries of the world contains a composed constitution which ensures key rights against the abundances and the detachment of the lawmaking body and the official. Such constitution after perceive the 'demonstration to life', equivalent security of law and 'fair treatment of law'. They preclude 'remorseless and unordinary discipline and debasing treatment or discipline'. The sacred legitimacy of the death penalty is an issue which has pained the sacred courts of the world. It is an inquiry the response to which gives a litmus test of the soul in which a preeminent court plays out its obligations. The cases where the lawfulness of the passing punishment has been condemned raise for judicial survey a state practice of questionable good appropriateness one impinging on the basic right to life of the most vulnerable individuals from society an issue wherein the guidelines of liberals are in struggle with the gauges of preservationists and regularly with those of the man in the road.*

*Historically, India has never seen any development for the abrogation of capital punishment. In any case, it doesn't imply that no endeavor has been made for its annulment. The protected legitimacy of capital punishment has been tested in a number of cases and this has been done on various grounds. The discussion of death sentence accepted new criticalness presented by the Indian Supreme Court in the translation of Article 21 read with Article 14 and 19 . The age making and point of reference breaking choice of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India set out the tenet of sensible technique for the hardship, of life and individual freedom. The Supreme Court held that the technique for the determination of life and individual freedom must be reasonable, just and sensible and not whimsical, harsh or self-assertive.*

*Justice is never advanced in the taking of human life.*

*- Coretta Scott King. Justice, Death Penalty*

## I. INTRODUCTION

The legal framework of many countries of the world contain a composed constitution which

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ensures key rights against the abundances and the detachment of the lawmaking body and the official. Such constitution after perceive the '*demonstration to life*', equivalent security of law and '*fair treatment of law*'. They preclude '*remorseless and unordinary discipline and debasing treatment or discipline*'. The sacred legitimacy of the death penalty is an issue which has pained the sacred courts of the world. It is an inquiry the response to which give a litmus test of the soul in which a preeminent court play out its obligations. The cases where the lawfulness of the passing punishment has been condemned raise for judicial survey a state practice of questionable good appropriateness one impinging on the basic right to life of the most vulnerable individuals from society an issue wherein the guidelines of liberals are in struggle with the gauges of preservationists and regularly with those of the man in the road.

Indian Constitution is an amalgam of numerous constitutions, for example the Constitution of America, Britain and Japan. The Constitution of India ensuring the privilege to life has been lifted from the American and the Japanese Constitution. It might be included here that what we have acquired in the structure or style of articulation and not simply the right. The privilege to life isn't the something that constitutions make or even give. The Constitution just recognizes this basic and crucial right.

## **II. DISCRETIONARY DEATH SENTENCE: WHETHER IT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR INVALID.**

Under the Indian Penal Code, discretionary capital punishment is recommended in two examples. Under the main example wide circumspection is vested in the courts to look over capital punishment and a wide range of other lesser sentence. This example is followed in Section 132,194,305,307 and 396. Under the Second example, just a constrained circumspection is accessible to the court to look over the sentence of death and single elective like detainment.

Anyway in all cases, where the law accommodates discretionary capital punishment the courts need to practice the tact wisely in the wake of adjusting all the disturbing also, alleviating conditions going to a specific case.

All the difficulties to the established legitimacy of optional capital punishment have been made primarily based on the principal rights ensured by Article 14,19,21 of the Constitution. It is notable that legal understanding of these Articles is guided by the Maneka Gandhi case<sup>3</sup>.

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<sup>3</sup>Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 59.

### ***Pre Maneka period***

This period may likewise be portrayed as "Gopalan Period" as the constitutional interpretation of the basic rights ensured by Article 19, 21 and 22 was administered by **A.K. Gopalan vs. State of Madras**<sup>4</sup>. This case in past the extent of the current conversation. In this way a concise reference might be made to show its sway. In it, the Supreme Court set out that Article 19<sup>5</sup> and 21<sup>6</sup> were most certainly not enhanced to one another however were totally unrelated. It was additionally held that the method set up by the law in Article 21 implied methodology gave by the law of the express that is noted law. It did exclude what was known as procedural due process in America, nor were the standard of regular equity remembered for it. In other words, this choice set out that the court had no capacity to inspect the sensibility. If the law denying an individual of his life and individual freedom.

Accordingly, before *Maneka Gandhi*<sup>7</sup>, it was unrealistic to challenge the sensibility of the strategy gave by the law to hardship of life or individual freedom regarding Article 21<sup>8</sup>. Article 21<sup>9</sup> could be summoned uniquely by contending that the law of statute being referred to had no methodology for the hardship of life or on the other hand close to home freedom. Hence the protected legitimacy of capital punishment could be challenge just in this constrained manner.

This was also done in *Jagmohan Singh vs. State of UP*<sup>10</sup>. For this situation the established legitimacy of capital punishment for homicide under Sec.302 of the Indian Penal Code, was tested. It was contended that capital punishment for homicide was unavoidably invalid, as it damages, in addition to other things basic rights ensured to the residents of India. It was additionally battled that capital punishment was violative of the established right of equity ensured under Article 14<sup>11</sup>, as in two comparative cases one may get capital punishment and the other life detainment.

It has been called attention to by this court in *Budhan Chowdhary vs. State of Bihar*<sup>12</sup> that Article 14<sup>13</sup> can barely be conjured in matter of legal watchfulness. The challenge as for

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<sup>4</sup>AIR 1950 SC 27.

<sup>5</sup>Art. 19, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>6</sup>Art. 21, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>AIR 1973 SC 947.

<sup>11</sup>Art. 14, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>12</sup>AIR 1951 SC 191.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

Article 19<sup>14</sup> was that the sentence of death put a last and to all the essential opportunities ensured in this Article. It was battled that the opportunity to live was fundamental to the happiness regarding every one of those opportunities despite the fact that it was not explicitly referenced in this Article. Subsequently, it couldn't be wanted by any law except if such law was sensible and required when all is said in done open intrigue. The court, only for this contention, expected that the opportunity to live was essential to the pleasure in all the central opportunities ensured under Article 19<sup>15</sup> and this continued to look at whether Section 302 Indian Penal Code endorsing the sentence of death for homicide was sensible and in the open enthusiasm at the start, the court unmistakably pointed that the contention progressed against capital punishment in essence were practically like those brought up in the American case *Furman vs. State of Georgia*.<sup>16</sup>

The court additionally held that capital punishment was neither pitiless nor strange. Justice Palekar clarified that demise punitively was not and strange discipline in India. It had a long administrative history in India and had been perceived by the constitution as an allowable discipline. The designers of the constitution were very much aware of its reality and made arrangement for claim and relief and so forth in capital cases.<sup>17</sup>

Additionally Justice Palekar called attention to that the popular conclusion in India was against the annulment of capital punishment. This was reflected through the rehashed dismissal of the bills and goals presented in the Parliament for the annulment of this outrageous punishment. Furthermore, the court followed the whole methodology for the preliminary of an individual blamed for homicide and presumed that it contained a few inbuilt shields which adequately made preparations for any rushed choice.

Accordingly, the contention dependent on Article 19<sup>18</sup> couldn't dazzle the court. In maintaining the protected legitimacy of death penalty<sup>19</sup> vide Article 19<sup>20</sup>, the court intensely depended upon the 35th Report of the law commission of India as it was the as it were definitive investigation made regarding this matter in India. The law commission had supported the maintenance of capital punishment taking into account the conditions winning

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<sup>14</sup>Article 19, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> (1972) 408 vs. 238,33,L.Ed 2d 346.

<sup>17</sup> The Court refined to Article 72 (1) (c) 134 of the Constitution in the connection.

<sup>18</sup> Art. 19, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>19</sup> In 1931, an abolition Bill was introduced in the legislative Assembly by Gaya Prasad Sing, in 1956, a bill for abolition was introduced in by the Mukund Lai Agarwal in 1958, a Resolution for abolition was moved in the Rajya Sabha by Prithvi Raj Kapoor in 1961, a similar resolution.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid.

in India.<sup>21</sup> In the light of this Report the court presumed that capital punishment was neither absurd nor against the open intrigue.

The Court was likewise not dazzled by the contentions dependent on Article 21<sup>22</sup>. It was fought that the law didn't give any method to settling on a decision between capital punishment and life detainment. Along these lines, as there was no 'technique built up by law' in the issue of sentence, Section 302 was hit by Article 21.

After Jagmohan Singh's<sup>23</sup> case, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was amended in 1973. The new Code contain two new arrangement under Section 235 (2) and 354 (3) which directed the course of death sentence in any place given by law. The previous requires the condemning adjudicator to hear the individual, indicted for an offense, on the subject of sentence before passing the sentence on him as indicated by law.

Further, the choice of the Supreme Court in Maneka Gandhi<sup>24</sup> case totally changed the Gopalan understanding of central rights under whose sway the main test to the protected legitimacy of death punishment was managed by the Supreme Court. Under the Gopalan view, the regulation of fair treatment was definitely not permitted to shading the understanding of Article 21<sup>25</sup> for a long time after the initiation of the constitution in see of the express goal of the designers of the Constitution. The court didn't guarantee the ability to audit sensibility or decency of the strategy endorsed by law for the hardship of personal freedom.

### ***Post Maneka Period***

The advancements in the procedural law identifying with imposition of death punishment and the new elements of Article 21<sup>26</sup> unfurled by Maneka Gandhi<sup>27</sup> case urged the attorneys to reagitate the topic of defendability of death sentence.

This time the established allure of the capital punishment came up for the thought of the court in ***Rajendra Prasad vs. State of UP.***<sup>28</sup> Justice Krishna Iyer observed, "*We banish possible confusion about the precise issue before us it is not the constitutionality of the provision for death penalty, but only the canalisation of the sentencing discretion in a competing situation. The former problem is now beyond forensic doubt after Jagmohan Singh..... and the latter is*

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<sup>21</sup> The law commission of India: 35th report on Capital Punishment 1967, Vol. I, 354.

<sup>22</sup> Art. 21, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>23</sup> Jagmohan Singh vs. State of UP, AIR 1973 SC 947.

<sup>24</sup> Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 59.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> Article 21, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>27</sup> Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 59.

<sup>28</sup> AIR 1979 SC 916.

*in critical need of tangible guidelines at once constitutional and functional.”*

Despite the fact that Rajendra Prasad has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Bachan Singh<sup>29</sup> the standards set down and certain perceptions made by Justice Krishna Iyer have the right to be taken note.

Justice Iyer called attention to that Section 302<sup>30</sup> essentially gave the tact to the Judges to force either capital punishment or life detainment on the individual sentenced for the offense of homicide, without giving, any rules regarding the exercise of that carefulness. He expressed that unguided prudence in this issue even in the hands of the adjudicators was grave hazard as the inquiry required as of desperate. The matter ought to be looked into on account of the unalterable idea of capital punishment. The blunder submitted by the Judges in condemning an individual to death was past adjustment.

He expressed that the absence of rules to manage the activity of condemning caution prompted vulnerability and disarray expounding on this, he saw that in spite of the definition of specific rules for the activity of condemning caution by the Supreme Court in *Ediga Anamma's*<sup>31</sup> case, no reliable pattern had developed in this regard. He additionally called attention to that in Jagmohan Singh<sup>32</sup> the court had held that the condemning caution should be practiced on the 'very much perceived standards.' These all around perceived standards' should have been deciphered. Further, as indicated by him, the nonappearance of rules to manage the activity of condemning carefulness might be hit by Article 21<sup>33</sup>.

Depending on the idea of social equity revered in the introduction and preface and part IV and Article 38<sup>34</sup>, Justice Krishna Iyer said that social equity was a variable idea changing with age and wrongdoing. In a creating nation, in the region of wrongdoing and discipline, social equity was to be sanely estimated by social barrier and equipped to formative objectives. Along these lines, as indicated by him, capital punishment could be truly perpetrated if there should be an occurrence of solidified homicides representing a steady danger to government managed savings. In this association, he observed<sup>35</sup>: *“If the murderous operation of a die hard criminal jeopardizes social security in persistent, planned and perilous fashion, then his enjoyment of fundamental rights may be rightly annihilated.”*

Justice Iyer set forward a few different reasons against capital punishment counting those

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<sup>29</sup>Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898.

<sup>30</sup> Sec. 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860.

<sup>31</sup>Ediga Anamma vs. State of AP, AIR 1974 SG 799.

<sup>32</sup>Jagmohan Singh vs. State of UP, AIR 1973 SC 947.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Art. 38, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>35</sup>Rajendra Prasad vs. State of UP, AIR 1979 SC 916.

dependent on penological ground. He took the view that the capital punishment ought to be forced distinctly for those situation where the criminal was past a odds of renewal. Another critical contention against capital punishment, set forward by Justice Iyer was that capital punishment was commonly forced on poor people, the oblivious, the feeble and the loathed. These incorporate the striking laborers, frantic with defeat, the political dissidents and liberators keen on changing the social request from Evil mismanagement, the dismissed youngsters transformed into hooligans and so forth. However, the rich and sourceful individuals regularly got away from the sentence of death.

He held that in granting capital punishment, the totality of conditions of the offense and the guilty party were to be thought of, with unique accentuation on the wrongdoer.

In this way in Rajendra Prasad<sup>36</sup>, the majority needed Section 302 Indian Penal Code and Section 354 (3), Criminal Procedure Code to be perused in the empathetic light of Part III and the Preamble of the Constitution. In Justice Krishna Iyer's view, the individual, social, persuasive and physical conditions of the offense and the wrongdoer were the significant factors in choosing the sentence. It additionally held that Article 14<sup>37</sup>,19<sup>38</sup> and 38<sup>39</sup> approved expression of capital punishment just in the restricted class of cases.

Rajendra Prasad<sup>40</sup> was followed in *Bishnu Dec Shaw vs. State of West Bengal*.<sup>41</sup> For this situation as well, the intrigue was constrained distinctly to the topic of quantum of sentence however, the court analyzed the protected allure of capital punishment. Motivated by the majority decision in Rajendra Prasad<sup>42</sup>, Justice Chinnappa Reddy a resounded sees like those communicated that case and subbed the passing condemned forced on the appealing party with life detainment.

Justice Reddy said capital punishment was an absolutely unavoidable and cruel discipline and it invalidated the fundamental point of criminal equity by dismissing the recovery of the guilty party. He additionally attested that capital punishment couldn't be defended based on the speculations of retaliation, condemnation, discouragement and anticipation. Another constraint of capital punishment was its convincing class composition. Heobserved that capital punishment was forced for the most part on the wrongdoer from the financially and instructively lower layers of the general public. He additionally held that capital punishment

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Art. 14, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>38</sup> Art. 19, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Rajendra Prasad vs. State of UP, AIR 1979 SC 916.

<sup>41</sup>Ibid.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

didn't affirm to the present guidelines of tolerability. It damaged the essential human right for example the privilege to life and affronted human dignity.<sup>43</sup>

Hence, the holding of Rajendra Prasad<sup>44</sup> was not in consonance with that of Jagmohan Singh<sup>45</sup> and its general impact was the weakening of the authority of Jagmohan Singh.<sup>46</sup> Another opportunity to implement the principle laid down in the Rajendra Prasad<sup>47</sup> case came in *Bachan Singh vs State of Punjab*,<sup>48</sup> yet the things didn't come to fruition as was generally anticipated. On the contrary, Rajendra Prasad was overruled and it was built up certain that the passing sentence for the offense of homicide was protected.

On the premise of Article 19<sup>49</sup>, it was fought that option to live was premise to the delight in each of the six opportunities ensured under Art 19(1)<sup>50</sup>. Since death punishment put a last end to each one of those opportunities, the law recommending it needed to breeze through the assessment of sensibility endorsed under Clause (2)<sup>51</sup> to (6)<sup>52</sup> for this Article it was too affirmed that as capital punishment debased the pride of the individual and filled no social or penological need, its curse ought to be viewed as '*outlandish limitation*'.

The contention was additionally sustained by bringing up the irreversible idea of death punishment; probability of mistakes in it's application, and barbaric and merciless technique for its organization.

Justice Sarkaria in his majority judgement had taken the view that condemning tact was innate and attractive and the condemning procedure would be out of line unjustifiable and indiscriminately uniform if this watchfulness was detracted from the appointed authorities. Indeed this view was not adequate to Justice Bhagwati. He was of the opinion that since capital punishment was fundamentally not quite the same as every single other discipline, principally as a result of its irreversible nature, it was not appropriate to leave the imperative inquiry of life and demise, to the sole caution of the courts, unguided and uncontrolled by the administrative guidelines.

As per Justice Bhagwati, capital punishment is brutal, barbaric, decidedly unfeeling and

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<sup>43</sup>Pandey B.B, "Face to face with death sentence Supreme Court's legal & constitutional Dilemma" (1979) 4SCC journal )30,44.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>Jagmohan Singh vs. State of UP, AIR 1973 SC 947.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup>Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898.

<sup>49</sup> Article 19, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

mentally exhausting. He said that capital punishment had been granted self-assertively and abnormally in the past by the higher legal executive.

Since at that point the courts have been regulating capital punishment with incredible alert just in the outrageous instances of wicked, merciless and grisly, murder submitted with pre reflection which as per them are the '*rarest of the rare cases*' of murder.<sup>53</sup>In *Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab*<sup>54</sup>, the court emphasized the view communicated by the majority in Bachan Singh<sup>55</sup> that passing punitively ought to be incurred in the '*rarest of the rare cases*'. Justice Thakkar gave a few rules for deciding the rarest of rare case. The rules identified with the way of commission of homicide, the thought process in the commission of homicide, against social or socially despicable nature of the wrongdoing, size of the wrongdoing and the character of homicide.

In *Kehar Singh vs. Union of India*<sup>56</sup>, the topic of defendability of capital punishment was likewise raised by the Supreme Court for this situation. It was encouraged for this situation while depending on the disagreeing activity of Justice Bhagwati that the established legitimacy of capital punishment ought to be re-evaluated. The court dismissed the supplication holding itself limited by the law set down in Bachan Singh.<sup>57</sup>

In *Jhумman Khan vs. State of UP*<sup>58</sup> indeed Supreme Court dismissed the requests for the reexamination of the intrinsically of capital punishment as unpersuasive and henceforth maintained the perspectives communicated in the Bachan Singh<sup>59</sup> case.

### III. WHETHER MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID IN INDIA?

In India the sacred legitimacy of mandatory capital punishment was thought of by the Supreme Court in *Mithu vs. State of Punjab*<sup>60</sup>. It was battled that segment 303 of the Penal Code was irrational and subjective and violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The court collectively held that Section 303 of Indian Penal Code accommodating compulsory capital punishment was unlawful as it disregarded Article 14<sup>61</sup> and 21<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>53</sup>Seervar. HM Constitutional Law of India Bombay N. M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd. 1983 Vol. 18.

<sup>54</sup>1983 AIR 957.

<sup>55</sup>Bachan Singh vs State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898.

<sup>56</sup>1989 AIR 653.

<sup>57</sup>Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 898.

<sup>58</sup>1991 AIR 345.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>AIR 1983 SC 473.

<sup>61</sup>Article 14, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>62</sup>Article 21, Indian Constitution, 1950.

Justice Chandrachud called attention to the fact that Supreme Court didn't lay down any theoretical recommendation that capital punishment was established. In scrutinizing the protected legitimacy of Section 303<sup>63</sup> it was battled that the governing body was not legitimized in arranging a specific class of murderers under section 303<sup>64</sup>. Such grouping annoyed the major right to uniformity revered in Article 14<sup>65</sup>. It was likewise contended that Section 303<sup>66</sup> abused Article 21<sup>67</sup> as the strategy given in that area for hardship of life was uncalled for and out of line.

For making a decision about the infringement of article 14<sup>68</sup>, the court applied the trial of sensible grouping. It called attention to the comparable inspirational powers worked on the psyches of the killer whether the homicide was submitted by an actual existence convict or some other individual. The murders falling under Section 303<sup>69</sup> merited same thought as those falling under Section 302<sup>70</sup>. The conditions that an individual was experiencing a sentence of life detainment didn't reduce the significance of alleviating factors applicable on the topic of sentence. On the opposite, in specific conditions, such killer merited more prominent compassion, comprehension and thought.

This drove the court to reason that there was no sound premise to recognize the two classes of killers to be specific, the individual submitting murders while experiencing the sentence of life detainment and other individual not under such a sentence while submitting murders.

Justice Chinnappa Reddy in his judgment, said that Section 303<sup>71</sup> was an anachronism. It was contradictory with the developing awareness and regard for the human rights. The Judicial review that Section 303 did not depend on sensible arrangement has been censured by Dhar<sup>72</sup>. Communicating the view that the classification under Section 303<sup>73</sup> was sensible and it had a sensible nexus with the object of the segment, he observed: "*A lifer convict committing murder is more dangerous than other criminals committing murder, and so there can be no objection to such classification based on such a reasonable differential that is obvious and admitted as reasonable and related to an object of specifying punishment for the same.*"<sup>74</sup> He

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<sup>63</sup> Sec. 303, Indian Penal Code, 1860.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> Sec. 303, Indian Penal Code, 1860.

<sup>70</sup> Sec. 302, Indian Penal Code, 1860.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> DharPanna Lai, Constitution and Penal Code: Mithu vs. State of Punjab, 1983 Cr.L.J. (Journal) 76.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

drew support from the decision of the Supreme Court in *Sunil Batra vs. State Delhi Admit*<sup>75</sup> upholding classification based on distinction between dangerous criminals and ordinary criminals.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

Historically, India has never seen any development for the abrogation of capital punishment. In any case, it doesn't imply that no endeavor has been made for its annulment. The protected legitimacy of capital punishment has been tested in a number of cases and this has been done on various grounds. The discussion of death sentence accepted new criticalness presented by the Indian Supreme Court in the translation of Article 21<sup>76</sup> read with Article 14<sup>77</sup> and 19<sup>78</sup>. The age making and point of reference breaking choice of *Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India*<sup>79</sup> set out the tenet of sensible technique for the hardship, of life and individual freedom. The Supreme Court held that the technique for the determination of life and individual freedom must be reasonable, just and sensible and not whimsical, harsh or self-assertive.

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<sup>75</sup>AIR 1978 SC 1675.

<sup>76</sup>Art.21, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>77</sup>Art.14, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>78</sup>Art.19, Indian Constitution, 1950.

<sup>79</sup>AIR 1978 SC 59.